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NOTES
An Unnecessary Conflict: Bifurcated Civil Trials and
States' Need for an Alternate Rule for Alternate Jurors
CraigM. Brunson'
INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE a complex products liability action is set for trial in Kentucky.
After months of discovery and pre-trial motions, the court orders
the trial to proceed on a bifurcated basis with an initial phase ruling on
liability and, if necessary, a second phase on damages. As is common
procedure in the state, twelve regular jurors are seated, and two alternate
jurors are empanelled in case a regular juror becomes unable to serve.
After five exhausting weeks of evidence presentation, the case is
finally ready to be submitted to the jury for the initial liability verdict.
Immediately before submission of the case, the judge's attention is
directed to Kentucky's rule on alternate jurors: alternate jurors must be
released immediately upon the first submission of the case to the jury.2
The judge, conscientious of the purpose and plain language of the rule,
is left with no choice but to release the two alternate jurors when the case
is submitted on the initial issue of liability. The alternate jurors, by rule,
are no longer jurors and are completely divorced from the proceedings.
After four days of intense deliberations, a plaintiff's verdict is reached,
necessitating a determination of damages.
Another two weeks go by as the parties present evidence on the plaintiffs
damages. Without warning, one of the regular twelve jurors becomes ill and
is no longer able to continue serving in the case. The defendant, already
wary of the unfavorable outcome of the case, exercises his right to refuse
a verdict by less than twelve jurors. The trial judge is forced to declare a
mistrial. Over two months' time and countless judicial resources are wasted,
caused, ironically, by a conflict between two judicial devices designed to
promote judicial economy: bifurcation and alternate jurors. This Note
I JD expected 2011, University of Kentucky. BA 2oo8, Kentucky Wesleyan College. I
wish to thank Professor Scott Bauries for his comments and assistance with this manuscript, as
well as Attorney Paul A. Casi for introducing to me this topic. I am also grateful to my parents,
Ray and Carolyn Brunson, and to my brothers, Stefan and Ryan Brunson, for their love and
support.
2 See Ky. R. Civ. P 47.02.
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explains why the previous scenario is entirely plausible and why several
states, including Kentucky, should change their alternate juror court rules
or statutes to explicitly allow for the simultaneous functioning of these two
devices.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial Bifurcation. and Alternate Jurors as Devices of Judicial Economy
The American trial. court system employs several procedural tactics
in order to facilitate justice. and judicial economy.' Two such tactics are
alternate juror rules and trial bifurcation. The use of alternate jurors has
been a procedural device employed in the American judicial system for
several decades.4 Alternate jurors replace regular jurors who become
incapacitated during trial, either during presentation of evidence or, in
some states, deliberations;' they serve to "protect against the unexpected
and ... ensure that at least [the minimum number of] qualified jurors will
still be available to deliberate a verdict at the conclusion of the trial."6
Bifurcation is also important to the judicial efficiency of the United
States.' "Bifurcation, the division of trial issues for separate and independent
evaluation, might be one of the most important concepts in civil litigation"';
the procedure most commonly divides the issue of liability from damages.
Bifurcation is an important tool for furthering judicial economy because of
its ability to "expedite and economize litigation." In fact, the benefit to
judicial economy is laigely considered the primary benefit of bifurcation,
with "[m]ost courts appear[ing] to have subscribed to the proposition
that: 'conservation of both time and money are the bedrock basis for the
[bifurcation] rule."' 0
3 See 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 21 (2010).
4 See FED. R. Civ. P.4 7 advisory committee notes (stating that an alternate juror procedure
was in effect in federal civil courts from 1937 until 1991, when the institution of alternate
jurors in civil trials was abolished).
5 Andrea N. Silvestri, Comment, Time for Change: Marylands Inadequate Treatment ofAlter-
nate Jurors and the Federal Solution, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 203, 205-o6 (2008).
6 Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824, 840 (Ky. 2000).
7 Although civil cases can be bifurcated, trifurcated, or polyfurcated, Steven S. Gensler,
Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 706 n.6 (20oo), for readability's sake, this Note
will employ the terms 'bifurcated' or 'phased' interchangeably, reflecting the most common
arrangement in state trial courts. It should be noted, however, that the considerations of judi-
cial economy addressed in this Note would be just as relevant, if not more, in trifurcated and
polyfurcated cases.
8 Derek A. Shoemake, Bifureation:A Porwerful but Underutilized Tool in South Carolina Civil
Litigation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 433,433 (2oo8) (internal citation omitted).
9 Id at 435-
io Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects of Bi-
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B. In Some States, Alternate Jurors and Trial Bifurcation Do Not Work
Harmoniously
Despite the proven benefits of both judicial devices, the two devices do
not work harmoniously in several state courts around the country, including
Kentucky." This is because some state civil procedure rules provide for
alternate jurors but mandate dismissal of any remaining alternate jurors
when the regular jury retires to deliberate." Therefore, in a bifurcated case,
no alternate jurors are available after the first phase of the trial." For years,
state court judges have evaded this dilemma by ignoring the plain language
and purposes of alternate juror dismissal rules, oftentimes to the detriment
of their litigants. 4
This Note explores the dilemma previously demonstrated and offers
recommendations on how to resolve the inherent disconnect between
current alternate juror rules and bifurcated trials. Part II of this Note
first discusses the importance of alternate jurors to judicial efficiency and
the purposes of mandatory dismissal rules. Further, this Part explains
and illustrates the rule existing in several state civil court systems" that
mandates dismissal of alternate jurors upon retirement of the jury to
deliberate and the overwhelming trend by which trial judges in these states
furcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 297, 298 n.6 (quoting Rossano v. Blue
Plate Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1963)).
II See, e.g., Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., No. Xo5CVooos77475S, 2007 WL 4574299,
at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2007).
12 ALA. Sup. CT. R. 47(b); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 47(b)(2)(A); ARK. R. Civ. P. 47(b); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 51-243 (West 2oo5); DEL. Sup. CT. Civ. R. 47(b); FLA. R. Civ. P. i.431(g)(i); HAw.
R. Civ. P. 47(b); 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 2-1 io6 (WEST 2003); Ky. R. Civ. P. 47.02; LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 1769 (2003); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-512(f)(3); Miss. R. Civ. P. 47(d); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
494.485 (West 1996); NEV. R. Civ. P 47(b); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-047(B); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 41o6 (McK-
INNEY 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-18 (2oog); N.D. R. CIv. P. 47(d); OHIO R. Civ. P. 47(D); OR.
R. Civ. P. 57(F); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1o-13 (1997); S.C. R. Civ. P 47(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
15-6-47(b) (200I); TENN. R. Civ. P. 47.02(2); Thx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.02o(d) (West 2005);
VT. R. Civ. P 47(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.ol-36o (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-6-iza (LexisNexis
2005); Wyo. R. CIv. P 47(d).
13 See Hurley, 2007 WL 4574299, at *4-
14 See, e.g., Lloyd Noland Hosp. v. Durham, 9o6 So. 2d 157, 16o-6I (Ala. 2oo5); Stivachtis
v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. CV98042o305S, 2003 WL 721495, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2l,
2003); Detraz v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 1287, 1287 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Stokes v. State, 843 A.zd 64,
67-68 (Md. 2004); Sulfridge v. Piatt, No. ooCA695, 2ooi WL 1764391, at *3-5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 26, 2001).
15 This Note discusses the problem presented by inconsistent bifurcation and alternate
juror rules in the civil context. While a parallel issue is presented in criminal trials at the state
level (and indeed a great deal of cases and commentary on the issue of alternate jurors focuses
primarily on the criminal side), the additional considerations of the criminal trial process man-
date separate analyses, which are beyond the scope of this Note. Nonetheless, because many
cases and commentaries in this arena do concern criminal matters, it is helpful to borrow some
limited reasoning and analysis when it is clearly applicable to the issues in both contexts.
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improvise and often ignore these mandatory rules. Part II also discusses the
importance of judicial adherence to the mandatory alternate juror dismissal
rules.
Part III of this Note explains the problems associated with such
improvisation and ignorance of alternate juror dismissal rules, specifically
in bifurcated or phased trials. Part IV argues that states that mandate
dismissal of alternate jurors at the beginning of jury deliberations should
amend their civil rules to officially and specifically facilitate the common
existence of bifurcation and alternate jurors. Part IV further provides a
model for correcting these rules and explains the model's benefits. Overall,
this Note aims to demonstrate that such amendments to alternate juror rules
would create clear, unambiguous procedures for the use of alternate jurors
in bifurcated proceedings and would foster an environment of efficiency,
fairness, and justice in an area of procedural law currently characterized by
confusion and improvisation."'
16 This Note's analysis of some ancillary issues related to this topic is necessarily limited.
First, this Note does not aim to resolve the long-standing and intense debate on the propriety
of bifurcation. See, e.g., Dan Cytryn, Bifurcation in Personal Injury Cases: Should Judges Be Al-
lowed to Use the "B" Word?, 26 NOVA L. REV. 249, 250 (2001); David L. Tobin, To B ... or Not
to B . . ."B". . . Means Bifurcation, FLA. B.J., NOV. 2000, at 14, 14-20. Rather, this Note simply
accepts the reported benefits of bifurcation and proposes a solution for the workable coexis-
tence of bifurcation and the institution of alternate jurors.
Furthermore, the Note does not attempt to contribute to the debate on the propriety of
mid-deliberation substitutions. See e.g., Jeffrey T Baker, Post-Submission Juror Substitution in
the Third Circuit: Serving Judicial Economy While Undermining a Defendants Rights to an Impartial
Jury Under Rule 24(C), 41 VILL. L. REV. 1213, 1228-33, 1238-44 (1996); Douglas J. McDermott,
Note, Substitution of Alternate Jurors During Deliberations and Implications on the Rights of Lii-
gants: The ReginaldDenny Trial, 35 B.C. L. REv. 847, 878-79 (994). Rather, it aims to illustrate
the reasons many states have chosen to retain the "mandatory post-submission dismissal"
rules for alternate jurors despite decades of consideration of the issue and to better demon-
strate the desirability of developing alternate juror rules that clearly allow for the provision
of alternate jurors in phased trials. See Hurley, 2007 WL 45 74299, at *3 n.3 ("Prior to 1980, the
procedures regarding alternate jurors in both civil and criminal cases were governed by § 51-
243, which required the dismissal of alternate jurors when the case was given to the regular
panel for deliberation. In 1969 a bill (House Bill No. 6809) was introduced to amend § 51-243
by permitting the substitution of alternate jurors after deliberations had commenced and re-
quiring the dismissal of alternates at the same time as the regular panel. The bill passed in
the House of Representatives, but was drastically amended in the Senate which took out the
references to substitution of alternates during deliberations and the dismissal of alternates at
the same time as the regular panel. The Senate version was enacted into law but, in effect,
as amended, it just restated the prior law."); see also Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Alternate
Jurors in Federal Trials Under Rule 24(c) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or Rule 47(b) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Io A.L.R. FE D. 185 (2010 Supp.).
Finally, this Note recognizes that it is the practice of some courts to select wholly differ-
ent juries for subsequent phases of bifurcated trials. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying
text. The analysis in this Note, however, presumes the use of the same jury for each phase.
Nevertheless, this Note also argues that to the extent trial judges may rely on the option to
select entirely new juries for the second phase of bifurcated trials, when alternates are un-
available, the model rule proposed provides a much better solution. See infra notes 172-78 and
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II. ALTERNATE JURORS AND MANDATORY DISMISSAL
A. Importance of Alternate Jurors to Judicial Economy
Courts commonly need alternate jurors in civil jury trials, and the use of
alternate jurors has a substantial positive impact on judicial economy." The
judicial system takes great care to prevent mistrials because "[1]itigation
today is ... expensive in time and money.""' Alternate jurors are extremely
important in civil trials because of the "increasing prevalence of lengthy
and complex trials, and the resulting rise in the opportunities for juror
incapacitation or disqualification." 9 Many states allow for the provision of
alternate jurors at the trial judge's discretion.z0 Alternate jurors are subject
to the same qualifications as regular jurors, and prior to their dismissal, they
retain all the same privileges and hear the same evidence as regular jurors."
Although the institution of the alternate juror has been abolished in federal
civil courts," it is still a viable and essential institution in America's state
civil courts, especially as court administrators increasingly "wince at the
escalating costs of jury trials."" Indeed, the use of alternate jurors is a major
improvement from common law systems in which mistrials were declared
when regular jurors could no longer serve."
High courts have been emphatic about the value of alternate jurors in
the trial setting. The Kentucky Court of Appeals stressed the importance
of alternate jurors in its analysis of an appeal claiming that a juror in the
trial was unfit for service." The court concluded its opinion in the case
with a universal admonition to trial courts throughout the state in regards
to alternate jurors:
We would be remiss if we did not comment on the jury procedure utilized in
this case. The court elected not to seat an alternate juror. When no alternate
juror is seated, the court is left no alternative but to declare a mistrial when
juror bias is discovered absent the parties' agreement to proceed with a jury
accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
18 Koch v. Rist, 73o N.E.2d 963, 967 (Ohio 2000) (Fain, J., concurring).
i9 Jon D. E hlinger, Note, Substitution ofAlternate Jurors During Deliberations: Constitutional
and Procedural Considerations, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 137, 137 (I98I) (footnote omitted).
2o See, e.g., ALA. Sup. CT. R. 47; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-243 (West zoo5); Ky. R. Civ. P.
47.02; OHIO R. Civ. P. 47(D).
21 Silvestri, supra note 5, at 2o6 (citation omitted).
22 5oA C.J.S. Juries § 259 (2oo8).
23 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND SPACE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR ARCHITECTS, COURT
ADMINISTRATORS, AND PLANNERS 98 (F. Michael Wong ed., 2001).
24 Silvestri, supra note 5, at 206 (citation omitted).
25 Nave v. Commonwealth, No. 2007-CA-002607-MR, 2009 WL 1974439 (Ky. Ct. App.
July 10, 2009).
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of less than twelve members. This result seems nonsensical when the cost
of seating an alternate juror is de minimus when compared to the alternative
of declaring a mistrial or, in the most deplorable scenario, proceeding to
a verdict with a less than impartial juror on the panel. We urge our trial
courts to avoid the result reached in this case by seating an alternate juror.
The seating of an alternate juror would have easily resolved the present
controversy at the trial level by simply removing Juror Boyd and proceeding
with the alternate juror.2
While this specific case dealt with biased jurors, the logic of the court's
statement extends to any instance in which a regular juror becomes unable
to serve. Because of the obvious benefits of using alternate jurors, appellate
courts reviewing such cases "suggest to trial courts that, when seating a jury,
appointing at least one alternate juror is a valuable safety measure, to avoid
... problem[s] and to protect trial proceedings."" Examples of reasons why
jurors have failed to serve throughout an entire civil trial are numerous and
varied: "family trips,"" "fail[ure] to return from a lunch break," 9 medical
emergency,3 0 "refus[al] to deliberate,"" "reading a law book" during a
break," sleeping during testimony,33 and "death in [the] family."'
B. Trial Courts Often Act in Contravention of Mandatory Dismissal Rules
In several states, alternate jurors must be dismissed at the start of trial
deliberations, according to the text of the states' rules of civil procedure.3 1
For example, Kentucky's Rule of Civil Procedure dealing with alternate
jurors states:
If the membership of the jury exceeds the number required by law,
immediately before the jury retires to consider its verdict the clerk, in open
court, shall place in a box the cards bearing numbers identifying the jurors
empanelled to hear the case and, after thoroughly mixing them, withdraw
from the box at random a sufficient number of cards (one or two, as the case
may be) to reduce the jury to the number required by law, whereupon the
jurors so selected for elimination shall be excused.'
26 Id. at *4.
27 Exparie Hunter, 256 S.W.3d goo, 9o3 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).
28 Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2009-0029 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09); 13 So. 3d 794, 799.
29 Hardesty v. Pino, 222 P.3d 336,342 (Colo. App. 2009).
3o Terrance v. Dow Chem. Co., zoo6-2234 (La. App. I Cir.9/i4/o7); 971 SO. 2d 1058, lo62.
31 Grassilli v. Barr, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 728 (Ct. App. 2006).
32 Carpenter v. Rohrer, 2006 ND II , '14,714 N.W.2d 8o4,81 i.
33 Sakler v. Anesthesiology Assocs., P.S.C., So S.W.3d 210, 216 (Ky. Ct. App. zoo).
34 DeGhelder v. Compton, No. oI-o4-00139-CV, 2005 WL 1606545, at *i (Tex. Ct. App.
July 7, 2005).
35 See infra note 37.
36 Ky. R. Civ. P. 47.02. Kentucky's rule was first adopted in 1953 and at the time was
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This type of rule (a "mandatory dismissal" rule), is the same model used by
twenty-eight other state courts.3 1
The language of mandatory dismissal rules differs throughout the states
as some states' court rules provide that alternate jurors must be released
"upon the final submission of the case to the jury."" Other states'rules follow
the form of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 47(b), prior to its amendment
in 1991 abolishing the alternate juror, which read "[an alternate juror who
does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to
consider its verdict." 9 While this language and the use of the word 'after'
do not indicate that this rule on its face is a "mandatory dismissal" rule,
"courts have uniformly construed the phrase 'after the jury retires' to mean
'as soon as the jury retires' or 'immediately after the jury retires,' but not to
mean 'at any time after the jury has retired."'40 Many state courts that do
not have mandatory dismissal rules employ discretionary dismissal rules,
allowing for the judge at his option to retain or dismiss alternate jurors after
the case goes to deliberations.41 Only one state, Washington, specifically
addresses bifurcation in its civil procedure rules.4 1
identical to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 47(b). 7 KURT A. PHILIPPS, DAVID W. KRAMER
& DAVID W. BURLEIGH, KENTUCKY PRACTICE: RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 191 (2oo5).
37 Twenty-nine states, including Kentucky, have alternate juror court rules or statutes
which mandate dismissal of alternate jurors at the start of jury deliberations: Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. ALA. Sup. CT. R. 47(b); ALASKA R. CIv. P. 4 7(b)(2)(A); ARK. R. Civ.
P 47(b); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-243 (West 2oo5); DEL. Sup. CT. Civ. R. 47(b); FLA. R. Civ.
P. 1.431(g)(I); HAW. R. CIv. P. 47(b); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 2-I io6(b) (WEST 2003); Ky.
R. Civ. P. 47.02; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1769(D) (2003); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-512(f)(3); Miss. R. Civ.
P 47(d); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494-485 (West 1996); NEv. R. Civ. P. 47(b); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-047(B);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 41o6 (McKINNEY 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-I8(a) (2009); N.D. R. CIv. P 47(d);
OHIO R. Civ. P 47(D); OR. R. Civ. P. 57(F); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-10-13 (1997); S.C. R. Civ. P.
4 7 (b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § i5-6-47(b) (2oo1); TENN. R. Civ. P. 47.02(2); 'fx. Gov'T CODE
ANN. § 62.020(d) (West 2005); VT. R. Civ. P. 47(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.o i-36o (2007); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-6-12a (LexisNexis 2005); Wyo. R. Civ. P 47(d).
38 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-18 (West 2010); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.oI-360 (West 20IO).
It is not clear from the rule itself what "final submission of the case to the jury" means. In at
least one state, but in the criminal context, "final submission of the case" has been held to
mean "when the jury retires to deliberate upon the sentence in the punishment or second
stage of the proceedings." Miller v. State, 2001 OK CR 17,'] 23, 29 P3d 1077, 1o83 n.6 (cita-
tion omitted).
39 Shapiro, supra note 16.
40 Id. § 8[a].
41 See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 233 (West 20io); ARIz. R. Civ. P 47(f); COLO. R. Civ. P
47(b); UTAH R. CIV. P 47(b).
42 WASH. CT. R. 47(b). ("An alternate juror may be recalled at any time that a regular
juror is unable to serve, including a second phase of any trial that is bifurcated. If the jury has
commenced deliberations prior to the replacement of a regular juror with an alternate juror,
the jury shall be instructed to disregard all previous deliberations and to begin deliberations
819
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Throughout the United States, trial courts' disregard of mandatory
dismissal rules is both common and alarming. For example, in Brockington
v. Grimstead, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered an
appeal from a medical malpractice lawsuit in which the trial judge acted
in direct contravention to Maryland's rule on alternate jurors.43 Maryland's
civil rule on alternate jurors is similar to Kentucky's,"" specifying that "[w]
hen the jury retires to consider its verdict, the trial judge shall discharge
any remaining alternates who did not replace another jury member."45
Nevertheless, the trial judge took the liberty of retaining two alternate
jurors after the jury retired to consider its verdict and even allowed the
alternates to sit in on jury deliberations without participating.46 In fact, even
though the Maryland mandatory dismissal rule had been in effect since
1984 4 the appellate court noted that the trial judge acknowledged having
"used this same [incorrect] procedure many times previously."48 Because
this issue was a matter of first impression for the Maryland appellate courts,
at least in the civil context, it leaves one to wonder how many times since
the rule's enactment similarly uninformed Maryland judges made the same
mistake.49 It also leaves one to wonder why this rule was disregarded or
overlooked by several, presumably competent, attorneys.
Situations similar to Maryland's are found throughout America's state
courts. For example, in Faderv. Planned Parenthood of New York City, a New
York appellate court reviewed a trial judge's failure to dismiss alternate
jurors before deliberations.s0 The New York alternate juror dismissal rule
(CPLR 4106) provided that alternate jurors "shall be seated with, take
the oath with, and be treated in the same manner as the regular jurors,
except that after final submission of the case, the court shall discharge the
alternate jurors.""' The appellate court ruled that the appellant had not
preserved the issue for appeal properly and had therefore waived her right
anew.").
43 Brockington v. Grimstead, 933 A.2d 426, 429-32, 446 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (re-
garding Maryland's rule on alternate jurors, specifically MD. R. Civ. P. 2-512).
44 Ky. R. Civ. P. 47.02.
45 MD. R. Civ. P. 2-512(f)(3).
46 Brockington, 933 A.2d at 43o.
47 MD. R. Civ. P. 2-512(f)(3) (amended 2007) (the current version still provides for the
dismissal of remaining alternate jurors immediately before the jury retires to consider its ver-
dict).
48 Brockington, 933 A.2d at 430.
49 Id. at 435 ("Although there are no appellate decisions construing Rule 2-512(b), the
Court of Appeals twice has interpreted its criminal counterpart, Rule 4-312(b), which is nearly
identical.").
5o Fader v. Planned Parenthood of N.Y.C., 717 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (App. Div. zooo).
51 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 41o6 (McKinney zoo).
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to the effectuation of the provisions of CPLR 4106, and the waiver did not
constitute the denial of due process."
The 2005 New York case Gallegos v. Elite Model Management Corp."
provides another glaring example of the need for better rules on alternate
jurors and for attorneys and judges to heed the rules. In Gallegos, following
an unfavorable verdict, the defendants sought to have it vacated, "argu[ing]
that the trial court disregarded the mandate of CPLR 4106, which requires
that the court discharge the alternate jurors after the case is submitted
to the jury ... by substituting those alternate jurors."4 During the trial,
however, and immediately before jury deliberations commenced, plaintiff's
counsel discussed with both defense counsel and the judge the need for
"keep[ing] the alternates 'on call' after the jury beg[an] deliberations, so
that in case one of the regular jurors bec[ame] incapacitated an alternate
could be substituted."5 Following a long colloquy, the judge decided that
substituting an alternate would be preferable to proceeding to a verdict
with fewer jurors or declaring a mistrial, 6 despite the judge's admission
that he had "never done it,"" that he believed it to be a "fundamental
error,"" and that he did not "think it would stand up on appeal.""
Further highlighting the importance of clear alternate juror rules and
the need for attorneys to take notice of them is Pillard v . Goodman, a
legal malpractice case arising out of Gallegos.o A defendant in the Gallegos
case, Ms. Pillard, brought an action against her attorneys based, in part, on
their alleged negligence in "fail[ing] to object to, and research the issue
of, retaining of the alternate jurors after the jury began deliberating, in
violation of CPLR 4106 and fail[ing] to object to the substitution of the
alternate jurors and to insist that a mistrial be declared."6' Although this
claim was dismissed because the court found that Pillard's attorney had
validly objected to the substitution at trial,6 the appellate court in Gallegos
asserted that Pillard's counsel should have been more "forceful" in his
objection.6 3 Pillard's action against her attorneys is not surprising
52 See Fader, 717 N.Y.S.zd at 167.
53 Gallegos v. Elite Model Mgmt. Corp., 807 N.Y.S.2d 44 (App. Div. 2005).
54 Id. at 47-
55 Id. at 49.
56 Id. at 49-51.
57 Id. at 49.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Pillard v. Goodman, 9o6 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
61 Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
62 Id. at*5-
63 Gallegos, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
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considering that clients lose the ability to object to erroneous procedures
when attorneys fail to raise objections at the time the errors occur."
One particularly interesting instance of judicial evasion of court rules
is found in Connecticut. Connecticut's mandatory dismissal rule reads,
"[a] juror selected to serve as an alternate shall not be segregated from
the regular panel except when the case is given to the regular panel for
deliberation at which time he shall be dismissed from further service
on the case." 6s While seemingly simple,' this rule has a history of being
dodged by Connecticut courts. In addition to at least two lower courts that
directly counteracted the rule's mandate,' the Connecticut Judicial Branch
itself has shockingly done so. The second note to the Connecticut Judicial
Branch's model civil jury instruction "Discharge of Alternate Juror(s)"
reads:
There are circumstances when the judge may wish not to discharge the
alternate jurors or to emphasize the possibility that they may be recalled.
Those circumstances will most often occur where the case has been
bifurcated or where, because of the anticipated length of deliberation or
other conditions, concern exists as to whether a regular juror might be lost
during deliberation."
64 See, e.g., Stivachtis v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. CV9804zo3o5S, 2003 WL 721495, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2003); see also Phoebe Carter, Annotation, Propriety of Substituting
Juror in Bifurcated State TrialAfter End of First Phase and Before Second Phase Is Given to Jury, 89
A.L.R. 4th 423,429(1991) ("[Ilt may be more prudent for counsel who wish to claim that ...
a [post-submission] substitution is improper to take all necessary procedural steps to raise and
preserve the substitution claim.").
65 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-243 (WeSt 201O).
66 The argument has been made that such a rule does not apply in bifurcated cases,
and that in such cases, "deliberations" means the second phase of deliberations. Defendant's
Reply in Support of Its Motion to Bifurcate, Hurley v. Heart Physicians, PC., No. CVoo-
o77475S (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2007), 2007 WL 6756972 ("[Iun a bifurcated case, the jury's
final 'deliberation' is after both the liability and damages phases of the trial. Under this analy-
sis, alternate jurors should remain during the liability decision and only be dismissed when
the panel begins final deliberation on the damages portion of the case, if the trial reaches that
stage."). This argument ignores the fact that the statute does not mandate release uponfinal
deliberation, but rather upon "deliberation" alone, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-243 (West
2010), and that there are sound reasons for preventing alternate jurors from being retained
during deliberations. See infra Part II.C.
67 See Stivachtis v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. CV98o42035S, 2003 WL 721495, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2003); O'Shea v. Mignone, No. CV87oo87935S, 1997 WL 331033, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 1997).
68 Civil Jury Instructions 2.9-8 Discharge of Alternate Jurors), STATE OF CONN. JUDICIAL
BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/Civil/part2/2.9-8.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
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These proposed civil jury instructions are not legal authority,"9 but the
state's judicial branch nevertheless published and endorsed the note, thus
indicating its promotion of this incorrect behavior.70
Although the previous examples have highlighted some of the more
interesting cases of trial court contravention of mandatory dismissal rules,
countless more examples are available.7
C. The Importance of Adhering to Mandatory Dismissal Rules
Whether judges retain alternate jurors in yiolation of procedural
rules due to ignorance or unwillingness to comply, it is clear in .most
cases that the judges proceed with the interests of judicial economy in
mind. The record in Gallegos indicated that though the judge considered
it a "fundamental error,"n he replaced the two jurors ."in the interest of
preserving the nine weeks that [litigants had] been at trial."" In most cases
when a juror must be excused and an alternate cannot lawfully replace
that juror, the alternatives are to have the parties agree to a verdict by less
than the statutorily required number of jurors or to declare a mistrial.74
According to a Kentucky appellate court, when an alternate juror is needed
but not available, "the court is left no alternative but to declare a mistrial .
. . absent the parties' agreement to proceed with a jury of less than twelve
members."" Indeed, in a phased trial, one Ohio trial court blatantly ignored
the state's alternate juror dismissal rule because "[flaced with [9] weeks
of trial, [34] plaintiffs and over 4000 pages of transcripts, the trial court ...
wanted to ensure that enough jurors would be present to reach a verdict." 6
Despite judges' desires to maintain judicial efficiency, it is important
that they follow the plain language of the rules of civil procedure in their
69 Civil Jury Instructions Home, STATE OF CONN. JUDiciAL BRANCH, http://www.jiid.ct.gov/
ji/Civil/default.htm (last visited Feb. 12, zoii) ("This collection of Civil Jury Instructions is
intended as a guide for judges and attorneys in constructing charges and requests to charge.
The use of these instructions is entirely discretionary and their publication by the Judicial
Branch is not a guarantee of their legal sufficiency.").
70 Id.
71 E.g., Lloyd Noland Hosp. v. Durham, 9o6 So. 2d 157 (Ala. 2005); Stivachtis v. Travelers
Ins. Co., No. CV98042o3o5S, 2003 WL 721495 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 21,2003); Detraz v. Lee,
2004-988 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/11/07); 955 So. 2d 1287; Stokes v. State, 843 A.2d 64 (Md. 2004);
Sulfridge v. Piatt, No. ooCA695, 2001 WL 1764391 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2001).
72 Gallegos v. Elite Model Mgmt. Corp., 807 N.YS.2d 44,49, 5 (App. Div. 2005).
73 Id. at 50.
74 Ehlinger, supra note 19, at 153.
75 Nave v. Commonwealth, No. 2007-CA-002607-MR, 2009 WL 1974439, at *4 (Ky. Ct.
App. July 10, 2009).
76 Matulin v. Acad. of Court Reporting, No. 14947, 1992 WL 7421o, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 8, 1992).
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states. Adherence to the rules not only furthers sound legal objectives, but
also preserves juror sanctity.
1. Adherence to Alternate Juror Rules Furthers Sound Legal Objectives.-The
most obvious reason judges should strictly adhere to their states'rules is that
the rules were carefully considered and written to further sound objectives.
Because most states' rules on alternate jurors clearly contemplate only
single phase trials," those that mandate the dismissal of alternate jurors
upon the regular jury's retirement to deliberate likely do so to prevent the
possibility that alternate jurors will be substituted should a regular juror
become unable to continue serving during deliberations. Courts seek to
avoid this result based on several inherent dynamics of post-submission
substitution.
The first concern is that the alternate jurors' inability to participate in
the earlier deliberations will affect their ability to understand and process
the deliberations as a whole." In rejecting the proposal of post-submission
juror substitution in civil cases, the New York Advisory Committee on
Practice and Procedure stated that "an alternate juror who enters the
jury room after deliberation has begun is not fully qualified to render an
intelligent verdict, having missed part of the discussion and consideration
which makes up the deliberative process."79
A second, and similar, concern is that alternate jurors substituted after
deliberations have begun will not be able to participate effectively because
of already-formed group consensuses among existing jury members and
the consequential nullifying effects on the views and contentions of the
substituted alternates.80 For example, the appellate court in Gallegos,
reviewing the trial court's decision to retain alternate jurors, stated:
[T]he two alternates here had not participated in the beginning of the
deliberations and therefore were not on equal footing with the original four
jurors, who already had the opportunity to weigh the evidence, consider the
views of their fellow jurors, and possibly had formed preliminary positions
regarding their ultimate verdict. In the worst case scenario, deliberations
may have progressed to a stage where those four jurors had reached
substantial agreement, presenting a "formidable obstacle" to any attempt
by the two alternates to sway the others to their view."'
77 Only Washington's alternate juror civil procedure rule specifically mentions bifurcated
trials. See supra note 42.
78 STATE OF N.Y. TEMP. COMM'N ON THE COURTS, SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Legislative Document 1958, No.
13, at 228; People v. Ryan, 224 N.E.2d 710, 713 (N.Y. 1966).
79 STATE OF N.Y. TEMP. COMM'N ON THE COURTS, supra note 78.
8o Gallegos v. Elite Model Mgmt. Corp., 807 N.Y.S.2d 44,49 (App. Div. 2005).
81 Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted).
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Ultimately, the court held that substitution of alternate jurors after
submission of the case violated the state's constitutional right to a jury trial
because New York's "constitutional right to [a civil] jury trial contemplates
that six persons participate in [the] deliberative process,"" and the
likelihood that the alternates will be unable to deliberate effectively can
easily destroy the constitutionally required participation." This argument
also received recognition in the federal context when a federal advisory
committee considering the mandatory dismissal rule felt that a "central
difficulty with post-submission substitution is that 'the continuing jurors
would be influenced by the earlier deliberations and that the new juror
would be somewhat intimidated by the [other jurors]."'These conclusions
are supported by psychological research and studies tending to "show[]
that an individual facing a group consensus may surrender his own factually
correct perceptions in favor of the incorrect group conclusion."" Simply
put, "[w]hen an alternate juror enters deliberations, he or she is forced into
a coercive atmosphere." 6 Consequently, "this coercive atmosphere may
pressure the alternate to prematurely agree with the original jurors.""
2. Adherence to Alternate Juror Rules Preserves Jury Sanctiy.-Another related
and fundamental reason that some states may choose to release alternate
jurors at the start of deliberations is based on the principle of jury sanctity."
Rule-makers in these states presumably recognize the dangers of allowing
alternate jurors in the jury room during deliberations and eliminate this
possibility by mandating the jurors' release when deliberations begin.89
Despite the fact that many courts ignore the rules, judges have expressed
their concerns with jury sanctity. For example, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland stated that "'[t]he presence of alternate jurors [in the jury room]
who have no legal standing as jurors injects an improper outside influence
on jury deliberations and impairs the integrity of the jury trial.'"" While
many courts instruct alternate jurors not to participate in deliberations,
and in some cases even instruct regular jurors not to allow alternates to
participate, these instructions can easily be ignored."
82 Id. at 48 (citing Sharrow v. Dick Corp., 653 N.E.2d 1150 (N.Y. 1995)).
83 Id. at 48.
84 Joshua G. Grunat, Note, Post-Submission Substitution ofA/ternate Jurors in Federal Crimi-
nal Cases: Effects of Violations of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure z3(b) and 24(c), 55 FORDHAM
L. REV. 86I, 878 n.123 (1987) (alteration in original) (citing 97 F.R.D. 245, 30 (1983)).
85 Id. at 878 & nn. 123-35.
86 Baker, supra note 16, at 1249 (citation omitted).
87 Id. (citation omitted).
88 See Silvestri, supra note 5, at 2o8 (discussing Stokes v. State, 843 A.2d 64 (Md. 2004)).
89 See Ehlinger, supra note 19, at 155-56.
90 Silvestri, supra note 5, at zo8 (alterations in original) (quoting Stokes, 843 A.2d at 76).
91 See Turk v. Silberstein, 709 A.2d 578, 579-80 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
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In some states, harmful prejudice from alternate jurors must be
presumed from their presence in the jury room during deliberations
because otherwise the determination of such prejudice would depend
on examining the jury deliberations directly, and "inquiry itself is [a]
dangerous intrusion into the proceeding of the jury."" In states that do
allow alternate jurors to sit in on jury deliberations, appellate courts often
find that no substantial prejudice or reversible error has occurred where
impermissible conduct of alternate jurors in the jury room is alleged.93
While this tendency likely reflects these courts' desires to avoid mistrials,
the allegations of alternate juror misconduct are frequent and range from
alternate jurors making gestures' to an alternate juror pacing back and
forth and even exercising in the deliberation room." The high courts of
states that mandate post-submission dismissal take a much more realistic
view of the effect of the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room; on
this issue, the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that "any time
an alternate [juror] is in the jury room during deliberations he participates
by his presence and, whether he says little or nothing, his presence will
void the trial."9 By mandating the release of alternate jurors "immediately
before the jury retires to consider its verdict,"9 .states avoid the risk that
alternate jurors, even those admonished not to participate, will indeed
become impermissible influences on the regular jury.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
A. Bifurcated Trials Present a Unique Problem for the Use of Alternate Jurors in
Mandatory Post-Submission Dismissal States
The tendency for trial court judges in mandatory post-submission
dismissal states to ignore their rules of civil procedure can present a unique
problem in bifurcated trials, a problem that has been exacerbated by the
increasing practice of phasing of civil trials. In 1989, a survey of state court
judges showed that eighty-two percent of the 800 judges surveyed had
ordered bifurcation, 98 and one scholar has even suggested that in the area
92 Koch v. Rist, 73o N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ohio zooo) (citing United States v. Beasley, 464
E2d 468,470 (loth Cir. 1972)).
93 E.g., Brassfield v. Moreland Sch. Dist., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 662, 666-67 (Ct. App. 2oo6);
Henri v. Curto, 908 N.E.2d 196, 204 (Ind. 2oo9).
94 Henri, 908 N.E.2d at 203.
95 Id. Antics such as this could likely be attributed to the frustration that alternate jurors
experience when not allowed to deliberate after sitting through long trials. See Mary Kaluk
Lanning, Comment, The Unnecessary AlternateJuror, 73 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1047, 1047-49, lo66-
68 (2002).
96 State v. Bindyke, 220 S.E.2d 521, 533 (N.C. 1975).
97 Ky. R. Civ. P. 47.o2. -
98 Symposium, Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial
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of personal injury litigation, 2000 was the beginning of an increase in the
frequency of bifurcated trials. 9 At any rate, "virtually every jurisdiction" in
the United States, including the federal government, "allow[s] bifurcation"
either by "procedural rule[][orl caselaw."'" While bifurcation is not
common in federal courts, some states encourage the practice more than
others, and bifurcation is generally regarded as "offer[ing] many benefits
for both litigants and the judiciary."'o
When civil cases are bifurcated, the jury retires following the presentation
of evidence on the issue of liability and deliberates until reaching a verdict
on liability alone.0 In Connecticut and Kentucky, the alternate juror rules
require that alternate jurors must be dismissed from further service "when
the case is given to the regular panel for deliberation," 3 or "immediately
before the jury retires to consider its verdict";*' twenty-seven other states
have language to the same effect. Therefore, in these states, if the court
follows the plain language of the law, subsequent phases of the trial must'0
be conducted without alternate jurors.'0 As previously argued, however,
conducting a trial without alternate jurors is extremely risky and can result
in costly mistrials."o" The risk is even more severe in phased trials because
subsequent phases occur only after an initial verdict against the defendant
in the liability phase, and research suggests that "[o]n the civil side, finding
the defendant liable takes longer than exonerating him or her."'
In the past, trial courts treated bifurcated cases with the same
ignorance of mandatory alternate juror dismissal rules.'0 These trial courts
Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 743-44
tbl-5.2 (1989).
99 See Cytryn, supra note 16, at 249-50.
ioo Shoemake, supra note 8, at 435.
ior Gensler, supra note 7, at 705.
102 Id.
103 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-243(e) (West 2o i o).
104 Ky. R. Cv. P. 47.02.
105 The use of 'must' here assumes that the court will bifurcate the case using only one
jury. Where a court employs a wholly separate jury for a second phase of a bifurcated trial,
the issue of mandatory dismissal is moot because the court can empanel a new jury with new
alternates just as it did in the first phase. Nevertheless, this is not the common practice in bi-
furcated cases, as the preferable and most often used method is to try the phases sequentially
to the same jury. See infra Part IV.D.3. Furthermore, judicial economy will be better served by
the employment of a rule, such as the one proposed in this Note, rather than empanelling a
new jury for subsequent phases. See infra Part IV.D.3.
io6 See Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., No. Xo5CVoooI 77475S, 2007 WL 4574299, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2007).
107 See supra Part II.A.
to8 Thomas L. Brunell et al., Time to Deliberate: Factors Influencing the Duration of
Jury Deliberation i8 (June 25, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=996426.
io9 See supra Part II.B.
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allowed alternate jurors to be retained and, in some cases, substituted
for incapacitated regular jurors in subsequent phases of the trial."o The
appellate court in O'Shea v. Mignone even ratified such conduct, finding
that it was not prejudicial for an alternate juror, who did not deliberate
in the liability phase of a bifurcated trial, to replace a regular juror in the
damages phase.'" However, the court made no mention as to whether the
alternate juror viewed the liability deliberation, nor did it even address
Connecticut's post-submission mandatory dismissal rule."' Rather than
ignore their states' alternate juror rules in these cases, courts should start
recognizing the discrepancy between alternate juror rules and bifurcation
as an important one considering the purposes of the rules. As one court
wisely stated, "[w]here the words and purpose of a statute plainly apply to
a particular situation,... the fact that the specific application of the statute
never occurred to [the legislature] does not bar us from holding that the
situation falls within the statute's coverage.""'
B. Only Recently Have Courts Begun to Take Notice of the Conflict
The specific conflict between mandatory post-submission alternate juror
dismissal rules and phased trials appears to have lacked judicial recognition
until 2007 when the Superior Court of Connecticut finally addressed
the issue in Hurley v. Heart Physicians, PC."4 Hurley involved a motion to
bifurcate a complex products liability and medical malpractice action."s
The plaintiff, opposing the proposed bifurcation, raised Connecticut's
mandatory alternate juror dismissal rule." 6 The court acknowledged this
was a matter of first impression in the state'"7 and ruled that the mandatory
alternate juror dismissal rule must be followed; therefore, it defeated the
motion to bifurcate."' First, the Hurley court acknowledged, where "there
[is] a bifurcation, the court [has] a mandatory obligation to dismiss all the
remaining alternate jurors at the time the case is submitted to the jury
i io See, e.g., O'Shea v. Mignone, No. CV870087935S, 1997 WL 331033, at *4 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. June 10, 1997); see also Matulin v. Acad. of Court Reporting, No. 14947, 1992 WL
742 1o, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1992).
iii O'Shea, 1997 WL 331033, at *4.
112 See id.
113 United States v. Jones, 607 F.zd 269, 273 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Patagonia Corp. v. Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 517 F.2d 803, 8ii (9th Cir. 1975); E. Airlines v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 354 F.ad 507, 5o-II (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
114 Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., No. Xo5CVoooI77475S, 2007 WL 4574299, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2007).
115 Id. at *i.
II6 Id. at *2-3.
117 Id. at *2. According to the author's research, this also would have been a matter of
first impression in any American state trial court.
ii8 Id. at *4.
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for liability deliberations at the end of the first phase of the trial."ll9 The
court explained that after dismissal of alternate jurors, the court would not
have the option to substitute an alternate juror during deliberations or the
subsequent damages phase of the trial."zo The obligation for the trial court
to release alternate jurors following the first phase was, in the court's view,
an unacceptable risk:
Given that obligation, the only possible legal manner to proceed on a
bifurcated basis would be to dismiss the alternates at the start of phase one
deliberations and just take a chance that none of the regular ... jurors would
become ill or otherwise unable to continue in service until the termination
of the trial. This is a risk the court is unwilling to take. It could result in a
needless mistrial after five or six or more weeks of trial proceedings should
there be a regular juror discharged during the second phase. The negative
impact of such a mistrial on judicial economy would be of a much greater
magnitude than any positive impact on judicial economy to be achieved by
a bifurcation. Nor is the risk to be ignored as merely abstract."'
Finally, noting that the trial involved complex and interrelated issues, and
that it was expected to last through the holiday and influenza seasons, the
court concluded that "[it would be irresponsible for th[e] court to ignore
the very real risk of a mistrial by proceeding on a bifurcated basis.""' The
Hurley case provides an example of a case in which the nature of phased
proceedings conflicts with the plain language of the state's alternate juror
dismissal rules. While cases of this type may be common, Hurley seemingly
represents the first case in which the court recognized the conflict and
proceeded in a manner as to avoid it.
Although the Hurley court was correct to adhere to the plain language of
the Connecticut alternate juror rule, it is unfortunate that adherence to one
tactic, mandatory dismissal of alternate jurors, eliminates the employment
of another, bifurcation, when both exist to further judicial efficiency. Wise
attorneys who oppose bifurcation in states with post-submission dismissal
rules will inevitably cite the court's reasoning on this issue. Hurley has
spawned recognition of this problem in other trial court proceedings.123
For example, in one pending Kentucky case, the plaintiffs vigorously
opposed bifurcation, citing, among other arguments, the bifurcation/
alternate juror conflict.124 The plaintiff's attorneys relied heavily on the
reasoning in Hurley, arguing that because of the similarity in Kentucky and
ji9 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., Motion to Bifurcate at 4, Shore v. Biradi, No. CV 05 4003924 S (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 14, 208), 2oo8 WL 2692725.
124 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider at 6-9, Campbell v.
Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. o7-CI-o36o8 (2009) (on file with author).
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Connecticut's alternate juror rules, and the complexity of the litigation, the
Connecticut court's reasoning should be adopted.' While the bifurcation/
alternate juror issue in the case is not yet resolved, it neverthless highlights
recognition of the issue in the legal community.
IV. THE NEED FOR A SPECIFIC AND CLEAR RULE
A. Eliminate Alternate Juror Procedurefrom the Scope ofJudicial Discretion
As with any procedural device, "some measure of [judicial] discretion"
in the use of alternate jurors is "inevitable.""' The question is, however,
at what point this discretion becomes vested..There are two primary ways
in which rules of procedure delegate judicial discretion: by expressly
providing for discretion and "by using intentionally vague language that
invites flexible interpretation.""'
A third measure of judicial discretion, however, emanates not from
the rules of procedure themselves, but from judges' "inherent . . . power
to manage litigation in situations not covered by statute or . . . [r]ule."25
In many of the previously cited examples of judicial contravention of
states' alternate juror rules, judges held no discretionary authority to retain
the alternate jurors based on the states' explicit rules.12 9 The situation
involving the use of alternate jurors in bifurcated civil trials, however, is
not covered by the plain language of the statutes or rules of many states,
nor was it addressed in former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 47(b).130
In jurisdictions where the law is ambiguous, it is likely that courts will
proceed in addressing the application of alternate juror rules in bifurcation
proceedings under their "inherent power" authority.
. There are, however, many dangers in allowing judicial discretion to
govern the treatment of alternate jurors in bifurcated trials: the judge may
allow the alternate juror(s) to remain in the jury room during deliberations
on the initial liability verdict, or she may sequester alternates outside
the jury room with no means of observing the initial deliberations. The
first discretionary option is impermissible because the mere presence of
125 Id
126 Robert G. Bone, Who Deides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961, 1964 (2007).
127 Id. at 1968.
128 Id. at 1967 (citation omitted).
129 See supra Part II.B.
130 Shapiro, supra note 16, at 203 ("Although requiring in general terms that alternate
jurors be discharged 'after the jury retires to consider its verdict,' Rules 24(c) and 47(b) do
not purport to deal specifically with cases in which (I) separate issues (such as the issue of
liability and the issue of damages in a personal injury action) are tried separately, and (2) the
jury first 'retires to consider its verdict' on one issue and later 'retires to consider its verdict'
on a different issue.").
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alternate jurors in the jury room is a risk to both the impartiality and sanctity
of the jury.'31 The traditional sequestration option is also undesirable
because an alternate juror would miss the benefit of the regular jury's initial
deliberations and therefore be handicapped if called to serve later in the
trial. The retention of alternate jurors throughout all stages of a trial is very
important in bifurcated cases, and this Note argues that the benefits of
juror observation can be achieved through alternate juror sequestration and
the use of audiovisual technology."2 In bifurcated cases, then, a rule clearly
specifying an ideal alternate juror procedure is preferable to the exercise of
inherent authority, which may result in methods that threaten the fairness
of the trial.
B. States Should Enact a Special Amended Rule to Provide for Alternate Jurors
in Phased Trials
This Note proposes that states amend their mandatory dismissal rules
by inserting provisions for the retention of alternate jurors in bifurcated
cases until the submission of the case to the jury in the final phase of the
trial. This retention should be for the sole purpose of replacing jurors who
become incapacitated during the presentation of evidence in latter stages of
the trial; jurors should not be replaced during the progression of any set of
deliberations. As the regular jury deliberates following the first phase of the
trial, alternate jurors should be sequestered in another room equipped with
audiovisual equipment sufficient to allow the alternates to fully monitor
the regular jury deliberations. This will reinforce their comprehension of
the evidence presented and allow them to understand the conclusions of
the initial verdict. Subsequent to the first set of deliberations, alternate
jurors should be recalled to the jury box. and again be afforded the same
opportunity as the regular jurors to hear testimony. As a result, the alternate
jurors will be as informed of the trial testimony and evidence as the regular
jurors, and should a regular juror become incapacitated during presentation
of evidence in the subsequent phases, an alternate juror will be available to
then deliberate intelligently and competently.
To accomplish this procedure, courts should use the same technology
already employed in courthouses for other purposes. Video technology is
used extensively in America's trial courts for "[v]ideo-teleconferencing
between remotely located witnesses and attorneys' offices or courtrooms,"
"[vlideo arraignment between jail[s] and courthouses," and videotaping of
witness testimony."' A state rule requiring a video and audio feed from
the jury deliberation room to a room containing alternate jurors would
131 See supra Part 1I.C.
132 See Supra Part V.B.2.
133 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND SPACE MANAGEMENT, stprd 1OtC 23, at 61.
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meet with few technological roadblocks in light of the current pervasive
use of video in the courtroom; also, "[v]ideotaping of trial proceedings has
passed the experimental stages and is being planned for all newer judicial
buildings."l 34 Implementation of new uses of video and audio technology
in the courtroom could potentially be expensive and burdensome, but
calls for such an expansion are not without precedent in other contexts,1 3 s
and generally, "the current trend is toward integrated, high-technology
courtrooms."136
1. An Amended Rule Would Increase Alternate Juror Familiarity with the Case.-
It is important that alternate jurors witness jury deliberations in the first
phase of bifurcated trials primarily for two reasons: they will be familiar with
all details of the trial if later called to serve and to alleviate the alternate
juror's frustration with his alternate status.
First, it is important that an alternate juror is familiar with all details of
the initial phase of a trial in case she is called, in a later phase, to replace a
regular juror; this includes knowing what occurs during deliberations. This
is important because the issues in the separate phases of a bifurcated trial
are usually related to some extent. 3 One California court gave an example
of how such issues may be related in the context of punitive damages:
Punitive damages are not simply recoverable in the abstract. They must
be tied to oppression, fraud or malice in the conduct which gave rise to liability
in the case. Thus BAJI No. 14.71, the instruction on punitive damages, tells
the jury that in arriving at an award of punitive damages, it is to consider
the reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant and that the punitive
damages must bear a reasonable relation to the actual damages. In order for
a jury to evaluate the oppression, fraud or malice in the conduct giving rise
to liability in the case, it must consider the conduct giving rise to liability."'
While this language deals with punitive damages explicitly, its logic applies
to almost all cases of bifurcation. One scholar notes that in personal injury
cases, "medical evidence may 'be important to both the liability issue as
well as to the damages issue.'""9
The Supreme Court of Montana also provided compelling support
for the proposition that all jury members, regular or alternate, should be
134 Id.
135 Anne Bowen Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote De-
fendant, 78 TuL. L. REV. 1089, 1o89 (2004) (suggesting that courts make videoconferencing
equipment available to clients for videoconferencing with their attorneys).
136 Fredric I. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom?A Consideration of Today's-And
Tomorrow's-High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV. 799, Soi (1999).
137 Gensler, supra note 7, at 733; see also Shoemake, supra note 8, at 448.
138 Medo v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. APp. 3d 64, 68 (Ct. App. 1988).
139 Cyrryn, supra note 16, at 26o (quoting Griffin v. Warner Enters., No. A-97-I24o, 1999
WL 419900 (Neb. Ct. App. June 22, 1999)).
832 [Vol. 99
2010-2011 ALTERNATE RULE FOR ALTERNATE JURORS
familiar with all aspects of each phase.'" The supreme court ruled that it
was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to allow the bifurcated phases
of a case to be tried to separate juries based in part on the reasoning that
to try the bad faith claim to a separate jury would require a much longer
period of time because the second jury must be educated on the underlying
contract claim to understand the bad faith claim. In other words, the parties
would have to relitigate the entire case with virtually the same evidence and
with virtually the same witnesses who would be put to the inconvenience
and hardship of a second trial.14'
The court's reliance on the reasoning that to be "educated" on the underlying
claim a second jury would need to be exposed to the "same evidence and
. . . witnesses" is important because it supports the notion that a juror's
understanding of the evidence presented in the first phase is important
to his ability to competently decide the issues in the second phase.'42 And
because "[djeliberations provide the jury with the opportunity to review
the evidence in light of the perception and memory of each member,"'43
having the ability to monitor jury deliberations will benefit alternate jurors
in understanding the evidence. Furthermore, this would eliminate the
possibility, if the alternate was later called to replace a regular juror, that
"[w]hile the other jurors are fully aware of each other's view points and
the previously established conclusions, the alternate is not privy to such
information."'"
2. An Amended Rule Would Help Alleviate Alternate Juror Frustration.-An
additional benefit of allowing alternate jurors to be retained throughout
trial and to view deliberations is to alleviate frustration experienced by
alternates who are discharged before deliberations.145 One author states
that "alternates 'may suffer high emotional and financial costs, as well
as the burden of lost time' after they hear the entire case and then are
abruptly dismissed."'" Notably, this concern was highlighted in the
Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1991 amendment to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 47, which eliminated alternate jurors: "The use of alternate
jurors has been a source of dissatisfaction with the jury system because of
140 Malta Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Mont. Seventeenth Judicial Dist. Court, 938 P.2d 1335, 1335-
36 (Mont. 1997).
141 Id. at 1339.
142 See id.
143 Alison Markovitz, Note, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, i i0 YALE L.J. 1493, 1522
(2001) (quoting People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742, 746 (Cal. 1976).
144 McDermott, supra note 16, at 88o.
145 See Silvestri, supra note 5, at 217.
146 Id. (citation omitted).
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the burden it places on alternates who are required to listen to the evidence
but denied the satisfaction of participating in its evaluation."1 47
While alternate jurors acting under the proposed rule would not be
allowed to participate in jury deliberations, some authority suggests that
alternate juror frustration could be mitigated substantially through their
ability to observe deliberations. One commission on jury improvement
noted that "[aIlternate jurors report dissatisfaction at having been required
to attend trials and then been denied the opportunity even to observe
deliberations."148 The same commission found, however, that alternate
jurors who were allowed to observe deliberations were typically "very
appreciative" of the opportunity.'4" The previous statement describes the
undesirable method of allowing alternates to observe from within the jury
room; this Note's proposed rule instead provides alternate jurors the cited
benefit while eliminating the possibility of them becoming extraneous
influences during deliberations.
C. The Model Rule
The previous sections of this Note have demonstrated that mandatory
alternate juror rules present courts with a dilemma in bifurcated cases, but
also that a workable and beneficial coexistence can be achieved. Given the
shortcomings of current rules requiring mandatory dismissal of alternate
jurors,s0 the following amendments to Kentucky's current rule are proposed
as an illustration of the suggested change:
If the membership of the jury exceeds the number required by law,
immediately before the jury retires to consider its verdict in a single phase
trial, the clerk, in open court, shall place in a box the cards bearing numbers
identifying the jurors empanelled to hear the case and, after thoroughly
mixing them, withdraw from the box at random a sufficient number of cards
(one or two, as the case may be) to reduce the jury to the number required
by law, whereupon the jurors so selected for elimination shall be permanently
excused from service in the trial and not recalled for any reason at the moment
the regular jury begins deliberating. In a trial that will be bifurcated or otherwise
phased, the court shall employ the procedure aboveforselecting the alternatejurorts).
Upon the regular jury s retirement to consider its verdict, the alternate jurorts) shall
be sequesiered in a separate room of the courtfacility and be provided with sufficient
video and audio monitors ofjury deliberations so the alternate jurors may clearly
hear all deliberations and view evidence and exhibits. The alternate jurors shall be
instructed by the court not to discuss the case with each other during any point after the
147 FED. R. Cv. P. 47 advisory committee notes.
148 J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1517-18 (1995) (emphasis added).
149 Id. at 1518.
150 See supra Part III.A-B.
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regularjury retires to deliberate. No alternate juror shall be permitted to substitute
for a regularjuror during any set of deliberations. After the regularjury has reached
a decision in the initial phase or phases of deliberation, the alternate juro4s) shall
be returned to the jury box and again empanelled with the regular jury. Should a
regularjuror become incapacitated during the presentation of evidence in any phase
of the trial, he or she shall be replaced by an alternate juror in the order the alternate
jurors were selected as such. Upon the moment deliberation begins in the final phase
of the trial, all remaining alternate jurors shall be permanently excused. "'
The most glaring defect with regard to current alternate juror rules is their
failure to contemplate bifurcated trials; the model rule solves this issue
by providing for a separate alternate juror procedure for bifurcation. The
procedure would require courts to retain and sequester alternate jurors
during the first stage of deliberations and provide them with audiovisual
monitoring of the deliberations. Alternate jurors, under the rule, would
then return to the regular jury box for the subsequent evidentiary portion
of the trial. The rule permits regular jurors to replace alternates during
any evidentiary portions of the trial but forbids replacement during
deliberations. Finally, the rule mandates the alternate jurors' dismissal at
the beginning of the final stage of deliberations.
D. Potential Criticism of the Model Rule
1. Rule Could Create Impermissible, Distinct Jury.-One likely argument in
opposition to such a proposal is that the seating of alternate jurors during
the second set of deliberations constitutes the seating of an entirely new
and distinct jury. This argument is premised on the idea that the alternate
jurors were not members of the jury that reached the first verdict in
the case. But this argument should not prohibit the employment of the
proposed procedure:
Alternate jurors are members of the [same] jury panel which tries the case.
They are selected at the same time as the regular jurors. They take the
same oath and are subject to the same qualifications as the regular jurors.
Alternate jurors hear the same evidence and are subject to the same
admonitions as the regular jurors and, unless excused by the court, are
available to participate as regular jurors.'
In one bifurcated case in which the existence of liability was decided
in the first phase and damages in the second, an appellate court ruled that
the alternate jurors are as aware of the reprehensibility of defendant's
conduct as the regular jurors and, while they may not have personally
decided the question of liability, they were members of the jury which did.
151 Proposed changes to original rule are in italics. See Ky. R. Civ. P. 47.02.
152 Rivera v. Sassoon, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 144, 146-47 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).
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They are in as good a position to evaluate the [facts] giving rise to liability
as the jurors they replace.'
Furthermore, research suggests that one individual juror, except the
jury foreperson, seldom has a strong impact on jury deliberations.15 4 in
fact, "the jury's foreperson has been found to be responsible for one-fourth
of the total communication acts in twelve-person juries."'5 s Therefore, it
seems highly unlikely that the substitution of one alternate juror would
have such a substantial impact on the dynamics of the entire jury as to
render it in effect a new or different jury.
2. Alternate Juror Who Disagrees with Result of Initial Deliberations Could
Sabotage Later Phase Deliberations.-One criticism raised with respect to
alternate jurors who join the regular jury during the second evidentiary
phase of the trial is that an alternate juror who did not agree with the
previous jury's finding of liability'"'will be inclined to sabotage the earlier
verdict by voting to minimize the damages award."' On this issue, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated: "[iut is more proper to assume that
when a juror is outvoted on an issue (liability) he will accept the outcome and
continue to deliberate with the other jurors honestly and conscientiously
to decide the remaining issues."'s This statement is illustrative of the vital
distinction between mid-deliberation substitutions of alternate jurors and
substitutions in a later evidentiary phase in which the alternate participates
in the deliberations from the outset.
When an alternate is substituted mid-deliberation, after the previously
constituted jury has already formed a consensus or made substantial
findings, the likelihood that the alternate "will accept the outcome" is a
negative consequence of the coercive effect which practically may result in
a verdict by less than the required number of jurors.159 On the other hand,
when deliberations begin anew in the subsequent phase, the coercive
effect of the previous decision actually promotes the interests of fairness
in sustaining the integrity of the previous verdict by causing the previous
alternate to "accept the outcome and continue to deliberate with the other
153 Id. at 147.
154 SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAMICS: FROM ONE JUROR'S TRIAL PERCEPTIONS TO THE
GROUP'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 182-83 (2004).
155 Id. at 183.
156 In the typical civil bifurcation, an evidentiary phase on liability precedes the sub-
sequent phase on damages, but only if a verdict is returned finding liability. See Fields v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48,53 (Okla. 1976) ("The trial proceeds to the second stage
concerning damages only if the jury finds in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability.").
157 Id. at 55 (quoting Ward v. Weekes, 258 A.2d 379' 381 (N.J. 1969)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
158 Id. (quoting Ward, 258 A.2d at 381) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159 See supra Part II.C.
836 [Vol. 99
2010-20111 ALTERNATE RULE FOR ALTERNATE JURORS
jurors honestly and conscientiously to decide the remaining issues."'6 As
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated, "although a juror concludes in
a first trial that a defendant is not responsible for the plaintiff's injuries,
he is still capable of accepting as fact in a second trial that the plaintiff
was injured, and then determining independently to what extent he was
damaged."16 1
3. The Alternate Juror/Bifurcation Problem Could be Resolved by Using Different
Juries.-With the prevalence of both bifurcation and alternate jurors, a
natural question is why the conflict between these two devices has not been
the subject of more published case law. One likely reason is the tendency
for bifurcated proceedings that result in liability verdicts to be settled prior
to the second phase.'62 Another reason is that some states allow the damages
phase of a bifurcated trial to be tried by a jury separate from the jury that
determined the liability issues of the case.'16 While this practice itself is the
subject of scholarly debate,'" it certainly does not render the bifurcation/
mandatory dismissal conflict any less important for multiple reasons.
First, in some states, it is impermissible for different juries to decide
the separate phases of a bifurcated trial. 6 s In other states, however, the
decision whether to try the second phase of a bifurcated trial to the same
or a separate jury is discretionary,'66 and in those states, one may argue
the bifurcation/mandatory dismissal conflict is tempered by the option to
replace the entire jury in the second phase. The use of such a procedure
as a fallback in this scenario, however, is illogical and inconsistent with the
goal of maximum judicial efficiency.
The model proposed in this Note, in which the retained alternate could
join the jury in the second evidentiary phase, is preferable to empanelling
a completely new jury for several reasons relating to judicial efficiency.
Primarily, it allows courts to avoid the bifurcation/mandatory dismissal
conflict while still using the common and preferred method of allowing
the same jury to try both phases.'67 Furthermore, empanelling a new jury
i6o Fields, 555 P.2d at 55 (quoting Ward, 258 A.2d at 381) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
161 Id. at 55-56.
162 Gensler, supra note 7, at 7o6 (citation omitted).
163 Tobin, supra note 16, at 14.
164 Compare Gensler, supra note 7, with Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards,
Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat theJury's Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 505 ( 995).
165 See, e.g., Waters ex rel. Skow v. Pertzborn, 2001 WI 62,'[ 24, 627 N.W.2d 497, 505.
166 See, e.g., Malta Pub. Sch. v. Mont. Seventeenth Judicial Dist. Court, 938 P2d 1335,
1338 (Mont. 1997).
167 Gensler, supra note 7, at 735-36 & n.189; see also Granholm & Richards, supra note
164, at 511 ("Bifurcation is the separation of the legal issues or elements of a cause of action
for separate trials, ordinarily by the same jury." (emphasis added)).
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would necessitate a new session of voir dire,'18 which typically lasts only a
few hours but in some cases may take days or even weeks.'6" An alternate
juror, however, would already have been subjected to voir dire along with
the regular jury, and thus the process is not repeated.o Furthermore,
scholars note that "re-using the first jury is likely to make the second-
issue phase proceed much faster.""' In a wide array of personal injury
cases, evidence and testimony elicited as to liability and causation may be
relevant to the damages determination as well,"' and by allowing the same
jury to determine the verdict in each phase, the court can avoid needless
replication of testimony and presentation of evidence. The proposed rule
would provide courts that try bifurcated cases before separate juries a strong
incentive to abandon this practice and save court resources by substituting
a well-informed alternate juror rather than a completely new jury."'
4. The Amended Rule Does Not Eliminate the Risk ofJuror Incapacitation During
Deliberations.-Another potential criticism of the rule as proposed is that it
fails to provide a contingency in the case of a juror becoming incapacitated
during a set of deliberations. As argued previously, substituting an alternate
juror during deliberations constitutes an impermissible influence capable
of completely changing the dynamics of the deliberation and therefore
its outcome.'74 Despite its inability to cure the risk of mistrial in such a
case, the model rule is desirable because it reduces the risk of mistrial
in the context of an entire trial. This is obvious when one considers that
the average length of a civil jury trial in the United States is four days,
while the average length of deliberations in a civil trial is only four hours."'
Additionally, of the several examples previously cited as reasons for juror
incapacitation,7 6 most juror incapacitation is likely to occur throughout
the duration of the trial as a whole, rather than during the relatively short
time period between the beginning of deliberations and a verdict. While
complex litigation usually results in longer than average deliberations,"'
168 Gensler, supra note 7, at 735 n. 189.
169 James H. Gold, Voir Dire: Questioning Prospective Jurors on Their Willingness to Follow the
Law, 6o IND. L.J. 163, 18o n.97 (1984) (citations omitted).
170 See Kelso, supra note 148, at 1530; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 41o6 (McKINNEY 2007).
171 Gensler, supra note 7, at 735 n. 189.
172 Cytryn, supra note 16, at 255-59 (noting that the issues overlap in automobile acci-
dent cases, products liability cases, medical liability cases, intentional tort claims, and others).
173 The author recognizes that some bifurcated cases may involve phases that are sev-
eral months apart, and it can be difficult in these cases to reconstitute the same jury panel. See
Tobin, supra note 16, at 16.
174 See supra Part II.C.
175 D. Graham Burnett, A Juror's Role, EJOURNAL USA, Jul. 2009, at 7, 1o, available at
http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/ejs/o7o9.pdf#popup.
176 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
177 See Brunell et al.,supra note 1o8, at 2.
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the ratio of the average length of deliberations to the average length of
entire trials (four days to four hours) shows that the greatest risk of juror
incapacitation is during the presentation of evidence portions of the trial."'
This is the risk for which the model rule provides a remedy.
5. The Amended Rule Ignores the Distinctions Between In Person and Video
Communication.-Advocating an expansion of courtroom use of audiovisual
technology may attract disapproval from thosewhoargue that audio and video
monitoring or teleconference is both practically and legally distinct from
personal contact. The basic concern is that "the use of video[] [technology]
may alter the process in ways that have a subtle negative impact.""' Such
a contention has been made in the contexts of criminal defendant video-
conferencing and witness testimony via video-conference,8 o and the
proposal for audiovisual monitoring of jury deliberations will likely draw
the same type of objection.
Critics who raise this concern of audiovisual technology in the courtroom
reference a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
rights in the context of remote witness testimony.1s' This constitutional
concern, however, is not present in this Note's proposal because the
audiovisual communication is limited to the jury's deliberation; the
evidentiary phase of the trial is not implicated. Likewise, the practical
concerns most often noted with the use of audiovisual technology in
the courtroom are largely inapplicable to this proposal because they
deal with the inadequacies of the technology in facilitating two-way
videoconferencing."I Anne Poulin evaluated the use of audiovisual
technology in the context of communication between incarcerated persons
and courts and listed the following practical concerns: determining "how to
photograph the participants in the proceeding,"' 8 "inability fully to capture
nonverbal cues,"" and the inability of cameras to "replicate normal eye
contact." 185
With respect to the question of how to photograph participants in the
proceeding, the concern is that the "shot affects how the defendant will be
perceived by those in court."' 86 Clearly, such a concern has no direct parallel
to this Note's proposal. While the configuration of the jury deliberation
room will dictate the most effective camera placement for monitoring the
178 Burnett, supra note 175.
179 Poulin, supra note 135, at noi (citation omitted).
18o See id.; Lederer, supra note 136, at 840.
181 Lederer, supra note 136, at 840.
182 See Poulin, supra note 135, at 1089-92.
183 Id. at i io8.
184 Id. at i iio.
185 Id. at iiii (citation omitted).
186 Id. at i o8 (citation omitted).
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deliberations, preferably so that every juror may be visible to the alternate
jurors observing, there is virtually no risk that a poorly framed camera shot
of a deliberating juror could possibly prejudice either of the parties, as in
the case of criminal proceedings.
The second concern is relevant to this proposal but also should not be
prohibitive. Poulin asserts that "videoconferencing does not effectively
convey the full range of nonverbal cues.""' While this is true, this proposal
contemplates the alternate jurors' one-way monitoring of the regular jury's
deliberations while Poulin's concern is focused on two-way communication
between the defendant and the court.8 8 The third concern-eye contact-
also is evaluated in the context of two-way communication between the
court and defendant and is inapplicable to the proposal.8 9
The most pressing and applicable concern with this Note's proposal
is described by Poulin, who asserts that documents cannot effectively be
viewed via teleconferencing.'"0 This Note has argued that audiovisual
observation of the deliberations will afford the alternate jurors the
opportunity to observe and comprehend the evidence in the case.'91
However, as Poulin points out, "[mlaterial is absorbed and understood
differently when it is viewed than when it is received aurally."' 92 While
this legitimate concern can be carried over into the context of this Note's
proposal, it is distinguishable. It is less important for an alternate juror
to analyze evidence personally in deliberations than a regular juror. The
regular jury is free to examine exhibits entered into evidence in the jury
room as a means of deciding issues of fact in the case. 93 Because alternates
will not decide issues of fact in the first phase of deliberations, it is less
important that they review the exhibits personally than it is that they
observe and understand how the regular jury comes to its conclusions
of fact, including how the regular jury's review of the evidence led to its
conclusions. 94
6. Concerns Over Jury Privacy.-Another possible criticism of this proposal
is that audiovisual monitoring of jury deliberations by alternate jurors
represents a violation of jury privacy. 9 s Examples of this criticism are
187 Id. at i i o (citation omitted).
I88 Id.
189 Id. at i ii.
190 Id. at 1112.
191 See supra Part IVC.
192 Poulin, supra note 135, at 1112 (citation omitted).
193 75B AM. JUR. 2D Tal §1425 (2010).
194 See supra Part IV.C.
195 See, e.g., State v. Cuzick, 530 P.2d 288, 290 (Wash. 1975) ("[O]bservation, even by one
sworn to secrecy and silence, violates the cardinal requirement that juries must deliberate in
private." (citations omitted)).
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found in case law from Washington, where alternate jurors in civil cases
may be retained throughout deliberations but are forbidden from sitting in
on the regular jury's deliberations.'9 "'[S]ecrecy"' 9 7 and "'privacy"'l98 are
used in one Washington case addressing this issue, but the court's analysis
indicates that the basis of the privacy and secrecy concerns is the alternate
juror's actual presence and participation in the jury deliberations.'" One
author has noted that many federal courts ruling on this jury privacy issue
based their decisions on the fear that "alternate jurors' very presence in
the jury room may inhibit certain jurors from participating freely in the
deliberations, and that even a silent alternate juror's physical reactions to
jury comments and decisions could affect the deliberations."2" Under the
current proposal, alternate jurors would not be present in the jury room
and consequently would have no opportunity to participate. Furthermore,
it is unlikely that a regular juror's knowledge that he was being remotely
observed by alternate jurors would prevent him from deliberating freely
since "the regular jurors . . . view the alternate jurors as ordinary jury
members, because of the similarity in treatment and function.""o' Finally,
alternate jurors "take the same oath and . . . have the same functions,
powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors," and therefore with
respect to the secrecy of jury deliberations, they are subject to the same
obligations as regular jurors. 0
7. Civil Trials Do Not Need the Protections Afforded by the Amended Rule.-
Finally, one may argue that the effect of an alternate juror's presence in
deliberations on jury impartiality is less important in civil litigation because
severe penalties such as capital punishment and incarceration are absent.203
While it is widely accepted that fairness to criminal defendants dictates "an
impartial jury free from outside influences," 14fairness to the litigants in civil
jury trials demands the same sanctity. For example, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky stated that in a civil case "[tihe fundamental right to trial before
an impartial jury is ... basic and crucial in our system of jurisprudence." 0
196 See Jones v. Sisters of Providence, 970 P.2d 371, 372 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
197 Id. at 373 (citation omitted).
198 Id. (citation omitted).
199 Id at 374-75.
2oo Ehlinger, supra note 19, at 155 (citation omitted).
201 Id.at 156.
202 Id. (citations omitted).
203 The Alabama Supreme Court in LloydNoland Hospitalv. Durham seemed to suggest
this when it noted, critically, that all of the cases cited by a party opposing post-submission
substitution in a civil case were criminal cases, and that some of them involved the death
penalty. Lloyd Noland Hosp. v. Durham, 906 So. 2d 157, 166 (Ala. 2005).
204 E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,362 (1966).
205 Commonwealth v. Pittman, 425 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Ky. 1968) (quoting Commonwealth
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The court further stated the "general rule" that "'[an impartial jury,
selected and kept free from all outside or improper influences has always
been regarded as necessary to a fair and impartial trial, and anything not
legitimately arising out of the trial of the case which tends to destroy the
impartiality of the juror should be discountenanced."'" Furthermore, the
court has stated that "'[elvery litigant in a civil action tried by a jury or
accused in a criminal prosecution or proceeding is entitled to an impartial
jury, and it is the duty of the trial court to see that a jury of competent, fair,
and impartial persons is impaneled."' 0 With this statement, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky equated the importance of an impartial jury in civil and
criminal cases.
Some of the scholarship opposing post-submission substitution is
couched in consideration of the Sixth Amendment's provision of a "right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."z0 Because of similar
guarantees by state constitutions, however, this argument should not be
discounted as applicable only in the criminal context. As one high court
stated, "[it is true legal principles have been applied less stringently to
civil juries than criminal juries, however, we cannot conclude that there is a
double standard that can be applied to the sanctity of a jury's deliberations
based on criminal or civil process."2 0
Finally, because this Note's proposal has yet to be placed into practical
effect, it is unclear what other, if any, specific objections courts or litigants
might raise. Nonetheless, related procedures have been suggested in legal
scholarship.o10
CONCLUSION
The proposed model rule is distinguished from rules currently in
existence primarily because it contemplates and provides for a separate
alternate juror procedure for a phased trial, which permits alternate jurors
to observe jury deliberations by audiovisual means. Only Washington
has explicitly provided for the retention of alternate jurors in bifurcated
civil trials (although its rule also allows for post-submission retention of
v. Garland, 394 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964)).
206 Id. at 728 (quoting 39 AM. JUR. io9 Neu Trial§ 95 (2011)).
207 Wisdom v. Wilson, 450 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Ky. 1970) (quoting 50 C.J.S. Juries § 208
(2011)).
2o8 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; see Grunat, supra note 84, at 878 & nn.121-22 ("The sixth
amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury that is
free from outside influences. Any post-submission contact, therefore, endangers the impartial-
ity of the jury." (citations omitted)).
2o9 State Highway Comm'n v. Dunks, 531 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Mont. 1975).
210 See, e.g., Lederer, supra note 136, at 837; Ehlinger, supra note 19, at 157 (arguing for
allowing alternate jurors to listen in on deliberations via intercom system).
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alternates generally).2 " Nonetheless, even Washington's rule falls short
because it does not provide for alternates' observation of the regular
jury's first phase deliberations."' This proposed rule allows for a workable
compromise between competing interests, which together form the heart
of the conflict at issue. On one hand is the objective to keep extraneous
influences out of jury deliberations by prohibiting the presence of alternate
jurors during regular jury deliberations. On the other hand is the desire
to avoid mistrials and the waste of judicial resources. By utilizing a rule
consistent with the model rule presented, trial judges will have the option
of using both bifurcation and alternate jurors harmoniously, achieving both
objectives.
By sequestering alternate jurors and allowing them to view audio
and video feeds of regular jury deliberations, courts will afford alternate
jurors the opportunity to further understand the evidence and to hear the
observations of their fellow jury members in deliberations. As a result, these
jurors should be more competent to serve in subsequent deliberations,
as well as more attentive and enthusiastic about their roles as alternate
jurors.2
The concerns over case load management, cost to litigants, and judicial
economy, all present in America's court systems today, are not likely to
decrease without the implementation and usage of effective resource-
saving procedures.214 While the use of both alternate jurors and phased trials
is beneficial to judicial economy," it is unfortunate that, in some states, the
two devices cannot fully co-exist because of the mandates of these states'
alternate juror rules. As the use of bifurcated trials increases, and courts more
frequently realize the importance of alternate jurors, state trial courts will
inevitably continue to experience the need for compatibility between the
two rules. Astute attorneys seeking to advocate in the best interests of their
clients will continue to raise the issue. Rather than relying on fashioning
their own improvised procedures for promoting judicial economy, courts
in states with mandatory post-submission alternate juror rules should have
the benefit (and mandate) of adhering to a clear and carefully crafted rule
that will allow them to employ both important devices of judicial economy.
The inherent problem between the two devices could be alleviated by
the enactment of provisions in states' alternate juror rules providing for the
retention of alternate jurors through the presentation of evidence phases
of trial. This would effectively eliminate the risk of mistrial due to juror
incapacitation while holding true to the purpose of the current rules in
21I WASH. CT.R.47(b).
212 See Jones v. Sisters of Providence, 970 P.2d 371,374-75 (Wash. Cc. App. 1999).
213 See Silvestri, supra note 5, at 217.
214 See James S. Kakalik, Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation ofJudicial Case Man-
agement Under the CivilJustice Refornn Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. I 7, 17 ('997).
215 See supra Part II.A-B and Part III.A.
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prohibiting substitution of alternate jurors during deliberations. Thereby,
these two judicial devices, each aimed at increasing judicial efficiency,
would be able to co-exist in furtherance of the goal.
